DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Heber M. Wells Building, 2ND Floor
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF: **PURDUE PHARMA, L.P.**, a Delaware limited partnership; **PURDUE PHARMA, INC.,** a New York corporation; **THE PURDUE FREDERICK COMPANY,** a Delaware corporation; **RICHARD SACKLER, M.D.,** individually and as an owner, officer director, member, principal, manager and/or key employee of the above named entities; and **KATHE SACKLER, M.D.,** individually and as an owner, officer, director, member, principal, manager and/or key employee of the above named entities, Respondents.	**ORDER ON PURDUE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY PRESIDING OFFICER PARKER OF REISSUED ORDER GRANTING DIVISION'S REQUEST TO DEPOSE PURDUE CEOs** Case No. **CP-2019-005** DCP Case No. 107102

On August 14, 2019, Purdue filed a Motion to Reconsider (the "Motion to Reconsider"), seeking reconsideration of the August 12, 2019 Reissued Order on Request to Depose Dr. Craig Landau, John Stewart, Mark Timney and Michael Friedman (the "August 12th Order on CEO Depositions"). Not understanding the procedures applicable in this administrative proceeding, Purdue addressed its Motion to Reconsider to the presiding officer, Chris Parker.

It will not be the practice of this Tribunal to again address motions to reconsider on an appeal-type procedural basis to the presiding officer for non-dispositive orders issued by the administrative law judge.

Likewise, it will not be the practice of this Tribunal to engage in repeated rehearings or motions to reconsider. However, the Tribunal has broad discretion to reconsider its rulings in this proceeding and will do so in this instance.

The discretion granted to a tribunal to reconsider an order in the event of a discovery motion is discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in *Tschaggeny v. Milbank Inc. Co.*, 163 P.3d 615, 2007 Utah LEXIS 75. The Supreme Court said:

> We begin our analysis by establishing the proper standard of review. Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. *Gillett v. Price*, 2006 UT 24, PP 5, 7-8, 135 P.3d 8. Because trial courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary. *Id.* 619

Similarly, motions to reconsider are not recognized by the administrative rules applicable to this proceeding.

In affirming the trial court's denial of a motion for reconsideration of a ruling on a motion *in limine*, the court continued:

> Although a trial court "is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous *in limine* ruling," *Luce v. United States*, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42, 105 S. Ct. 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984), a trial court may also exercise its discretion to disregard motions to reconsider prior in limine rulings when those motions do not conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, *see Univ. of Utah v. Indus. Comm'n,* 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) ("A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her courtroom."). Thus, we review the trial court's denial of the motion to reconsider under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, the trial court's ruling may be overturned only "if there is no reasonable basis for the decision" (citation omitted). *Id.* at 619.

The Utah Supreme Court more recently addressed the matter of motions for reconsideration in *Gables at Sterling Vill. Homeowners Ass'n v. Castewood-Sterling Vill. I, LLC*, 417 P.3d 95; 2018 Utah LEXIS 5. The Court again noted the fact of the "highly" discretionary nature of granting such motions.

> Accordingly, district courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, and a movant has an especially large burden to show that the district court abused its discretion. *Cf. Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co.*, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d 615 ("Because trial courts are under no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary."). The district court's ruling may be overturned only if the movant can show that "there is no reasonable basis for the decision." (citation omitted). *Id.* 105

The Tribunal exercises its discretion at this time in favor of reconsideration of the August 12th Order on CEO Depositions.

ANALYSIS

With four pages of single space text in its July 25, 2019, Opposition letter, five pages of single space text in its August 7, 2019, Surreply letter, and 14 pages of double spaced text in its Motion for Reconsideration, the Tribunal has reviewed the equivalent of 32 pages of double spaced argument by Purdue on the subject of taking senior officers' and former senior officers' depositions. Due consideration has been given to Purdue's arguments.

The Presiding Officer also notes that the Citation, the Responses to the Citation of the Purdue Respondents and the Sackler Respondents, the memoranda supporting and opposing the motion to dismiss of the Purdue Respondents, and the memoranda supporting and opposing the motions to dismiss of Kathe Sackler and Richard Sackler, give a strong indication that the CEOs have unique and personal knowledge of matters of material importance to the Division's claims and the Respondents' defenses.

I. A sufficient factual showing is reflected in the briefing and documents before this Tribunal to demonstrate the unique and personal knowledge of the CEOs.

It would have been helpful if the parties had marshalled more information from existing discovery and pleadings to more clearly demonstrate the relevance and the need, or not, for the CEOs' depositions. However, as indicated below, a sufficient demonstration appears on the

record in this matter. In making the determination that CEO depositions are warranted, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the case of the party requesting the deposition has been fully established in the record, only that relevant information is in the possession and within the knowledge of the proposed deponent.[1]

As noted by Purdue in its Motion for Reconsideration, discovery is meant to be flexible (Motion p.3). Further, *United Automobile Insurance v. Stucki & Rencher, LLC*, 2:15-CV-834 RJS, 2019 WL 2088537, *7 (D. Utah May 13, 2019) shows that a deposition, once denied, may subsequently be held to be appropriate. With the discovery time periods of this proceeding and the issues already noted in the Motions to Dismiss and oppositions thereto, there is a considerable demonstration of evidence that supports the reality that the CEOs have unique and personal knowledge about relevant matters central to this proceeding. In making the determination set forth in the August 12th Order on CEO Depositions, it is not necessary to set forth an exhaustive list of these indications about the former CEOs Friedman, Stewart and Timney, or about the current CEO, Landau. Nevertheless, the following examples are instructive:

The Division asserts that Richard Sackler exercised veto power over Michael Friedman as demonstrated by an email from Mark Alfonso, Purdue's Vice President of Marketing, relating to packaging inserts saying, "Michael has indicated that Dr. Richard [Sackler] is not in support of this change, and any OxyContin PI [i.e. packaging insert] change will require Dr. Richard [Sackler]'s approval." Dep. of R. Sackler, 216-217 (Mar. 7, 2007). This information implicates Richard Sackler on the issue of control and his possible qualification as a "supplier" personally

[1] U.A.C. R151-4-502(1) provides that parties "may obtain discovery regarding a matter that is not privileged; is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding; and relates to a claim or defense . . ." This is the standard for the obtaining of discovery. Purdue's reference to U.A.C. R151-4-602(4) that the "moving party has the burden of demonstrating the need for a deposition" is misconstrued. The motion referred to in paragraph 602(4) is not a motion to obtain discovery, but is a motion to obtain a deposition when the interview process of R151-4-602 has failed. Here the parties have agreed to take depositions and forego the interview process. The language of R151-4-602(4) tied to the interview process cannot control over the standard of R151-4-502(1).

liable under the UCSPA, and implicates CEO Friedman as one having unique and personal knowledge of these central facts in the present dispute.

The Division further asserts that Richard Sackler had an unmannerly rapport with Purdue management and an obsessed penchant for intrusion in decisions crossing into micromanagement as a board member. Div. Opp'n to Purdue's Mot to Dis., 17 (Apr. 25, 2019) citing PPLPC012000368569. In March of 2012, an internal Purdue email sent to CEO Stewart says, "[a]nything you can do to reduce the direct contact of Richard [Sackler] into the organization is appreciated."

Further, Michael Friedman sent an email to Richard Sackler with the connotation of intrusive participation saying that, "you need a vacation and I need one from your email." *Id.* citing PPLPC039000000157.

Here again, Richard Sackler is implicated on the issue of control and his qualification as a supplier under the UCSPA, and CEO Stewart and CEO Friedman are both implicated as having unique and personal knowledge of central facts in the present dispute.

In depositions in prior litigation, Michael Friedman testified that he was directed to meet with Mortimer Sackler and Richard Sackler. *Id.* at 21, citing Dep. of M. Friedman, 94:7-94:23 (Dec. 5, 1996). The Division also asserts that Michael Friedman communicated with members of the Sackler family daily and that Richard Sackler and Kathe Sackler had offices in Purdue's headquarters in Stamford, Connecticut, indicating the level of interaction they had with the CEOs. *Id.* citing Dep. of M. Friedman, 34:5-35:9 (May 18, 2004). Beyond the argument of supposition regarding these matters, it is also the common experience of the corporate world that influential directors have frequent and meaningful interaction with the chief executive officer of

their organizations. Based on the foregoing snapshot of these interactions, the Division is entitled under the scope of applicable agency rules to pursue this line of relevant inquiry.

During his time as CEO, Craig Landau referred to the Purdue entities in a document with the title "Sackler Pharma Enterprise: Diagnostic and Forward Plan." *Id.* citing PPLPC0200001106306; *see also* Citation ¶¶ 126. In Landau's document, it says that, "the Board of Directors serv[ed] as the "de-facto CEO." *Id.* This reference is to a marketing structure "run through four separate regions." This information links CEO Landau with personal knowledge about how the board of directors conducted business and marketed the products of the Sackler Pharma Enterprise.

Based on the record in this matter thus far, it is evident the CEOs likely possess relevant information to complete the record. It is asserted that the Purdue Board meeting minutes do not contain information on the meeting attendance, size of the board, or the disposition of how anyone voted for an action; there is a deficiency in the record of what happened at the Purdue Board meetings. Mot. to Dis. Oral Arg. Tr., May 21, 2019, 209:19 – 210:11. The Purdue minutes apparently did not keep the information required by the Model Business Corporations Act § 16.01(a)(5) and it is asserted that this lack of detail is strategic. This is yet another indication of the relevance, and probable necessity of deposing the CEOs.

This line of inquiry implicates the matter of the control by one or more members of the Sackler family, the alleged misrepresentation of OxyContin's addictive qualities, and the alleged cover-up of these misrepresentations, all as alleged in the citation in this proceeding. This information also highlights the unique and personal knowledge of CEOs who ostensibly worked with Richard Sackler and Kathe Sackler.

Based upon information of the type reflected above, at least one expert witness has opined that the Purdue entities were controlled by Richard Sackler and Kathe Sackler and that corporate actions required the approval of these two Sackler board members. (See the July 12, 2019 Expert Opinion Report of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., p. 13, filed in this administrative proceeding and attached as Exhibit "A" to the July 31, 2019 Response In Opposition to Motion for Emergency Relief and Entry of Immediate Order re: (1) Stay of Administrative Proceedings; (2) Entry of Agreed Protective Order; & (3) Expedited Briefing Schedule filed by the Division in the Utah Court of Appeals).

The opinion report states:

> Sometimes the Purdue board even delegated typically managerial decisions to individual directors. A good example is the board resolution adopted on November 3, 2009 when the Purdue board approved the 2010 budget, "subject to (1) Review of the top line sales numbers, (2) review of the royalty payable to Grunenthal" and then in this same resolution delegated this review to a special committee composed "of Richard S. Sackler M.D. and Kathe A. Sackler.". . . [the] resolutions show the Purdue board handling normally executive functions and delegating important decisions to Sackler family members."

It is certain that if the Division is not afforded the opportunity to pursue the CEOs' depositions, then the Respondents would likely attack, with some success, the factual underpinnings of this expert's opinions. The Division is entitled to pursue this discovery in depositions of the CEOs.

CEO Friedman was serving as the Purdue CEO in November 2009 at the time of the board action referenced in the foregoing quotation. Richard Sackler and Kathe Sackler are implicated on the issue of control and their qualification as being personally liable as suppliers under the UCSPA, and CEO Friedman is implicated as having unique and personal knowledge of central facts in the present dispute.

It is equally important to note that (for the majority of the central issues in this proceeding) the testimony of mid-management Purdue employees will not be as meaningful as that of the CEOs. In fact, mid-management employees may have been kept in the dark regarding these central issues. (Of course, there may be other issues where middle management and front line staff have their own evidence to offer.) It would only be the board members and their CEOs who would have a reason to have knowledge about matters relating to the Sacklers' level of corporate control and personal involvement in the complained-of conduct.

As noted in the administrative law judge's capable August 12th Order on CEO Depositions, and in light of the allegations in the citation in this proceeding, "the Division would be ill advised to go to trial in this case without having taken the depositions of the CEOs" (August 12th Order on CEO Depositions at p. 4).

II. Busy, Burden and Hardship, and Duplicate Discovery

Decisions in other jurisdictions address the matter of the hardship and burden of depositions on executive officers. In the case of *Horsewood v. Kids "R" US*, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13108; 1998 WL 526589; No. 97-2441-GTV, *21 (D. Kan. Aug 13, 1998), the Federal District Court ordered the single day deposition limited to six hours of Richard Cudrin, an executive officer of Kids "R" US. The court stated:

> The probability that Cudrin can provide relevant evidence to a material issue outweighs the suggested burden of his deposition. That Cudrin is too busy and that a deposition will disrupt his work carries little weight. Most deponents are busy. Most depositions involve some disruption of work or personal business. "[A] showing that discovery may involve some inconvenience . . . does not suffice to establish good cause for issuance of a protective order." *Tolon v. Board of County Comm'rs*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19100, No. 95-2001- GTV, 1995 WL 761452, *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1995).

Since we are going far afield from Utah case authority, and since the Utah state courts have not adopted the "apex doctrine" urged by Purdue,[2] it is instructive to review the law in the jurisdictions of Connecticut and Florida where all of the CEOs either work or reside.[3] In the 2016 case of *NetScout Sys. V. Gartner, Inc.,* 2016 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2266 at *18, a Connecticut Court states that the apex rule does not apply in the state and relies upon a Connecticut Supreme Court decision reflecting broad discovery rights in a deposition. In denying the motion for a protective order and compelling a chief executive officer of a corporation to testify, the Connecticut court stated:

> The applicability of the apex witness rule in this state has not been considered previously by our courts. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the rule is incompatible with Connecticut law to the extent it shifts the burden of showing good cause to the proponent of the deposition. The plain meaning of *§13-5* and the consensus within the Superior Courts therefore militate against adopting a form of the apex deposition rule that would relieve the party opposing discovery of the burden of establishing good cause. This conclusion is further supported by our Supreme Court's decision in *Lougee v. Grinnell*, 216 Conn. 483, 489, 582 A.2d 456 (1990). overruled in part on other grounds by *State v. Salmon*, 250 Conn. 147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999) (en banc) ("It may well be that [the petitioner] lacks the information that [the respondent] desires, but [the respondent] need not blindly accept [the petitioner's] claimed lack of knowledge as reported by his attorney [The respondent) is entitled to test that claim by deposing [the petitioner), and any objections raised by [the petitioner] can adequately be preserved on the record of the deposition." . . . The Connecticut authority strongly suggests that the party opposing discovery, regardless of the position of the proposed witness, bears the burden of showing good cause.

The Connecticut Supreme Court decision in the cited case of *Lougee v. Grinnell*, 582 A.2d, 456; 1990 Conn. LEXIS 407, arises in the context of a case with many similarities to the facts or arguments made here. The deponent was not currently serving as CEO, but was a former chief executive officer of the American Tobacco Company ("American"). Importantly, he served as CEO during a period of time when the trial court had already determined that claims

---

[2] See pages 5 and 6 of the August 12th Order on CEO Depositions.
[3] Landau and Timney reside in Connecticut. Stewart resides in Florida. Friedman at least formerly resided in Connecticut, but may now reside in the State of New York.

for that period were dismissed as a matter of law. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that Connecticut law "liberally permits discovery of information 'material to the *subject matter involved in the pending action* . . .' (emphasis in original). Information material to the subject matter of a lawsuit certainly includes a broader spectrum of data than that which is material to the precise issues raised in the pleadings. Thus, the fact that the issues in the [plaintiff's] action relate to a time period ending before [the deponent] became CEO for American does not necessarily render his knowledge immaterial to the [plaintiff's] lawsuit." *Id.* at 459.

The deponent in *Lougee* had already given a deposition in a New Jersey action similar to the *Lougee* lawsuit. The Court stated "we do not think that [the plaintiff] should be bound by the testimony taken by another plaintiff in an unrelated ["smoke and health"] action . . . our discovery rules do not exempt a prospective deponent from testifying merely because the applicant has access to alternative sources of information." *Id.* at 460. Though the material in the MDL litigation is not completely unrelated to the claims in this matter, it is likely different enough, given this matter's focus on Utah and its different legal basis.

The deponent in *Lougee*, through counsel, denied that he had any information relevant to the plaintiff's claim. The Connecticut Supreme Court said that it "may well be that [the deponent] lacks the information that [plaintiff] desires, but [the plaintiff] need not blindly accept [the deponent's] claimed lack of knowledge as reported by his attorney. [The plaintiff] is entitled to test that claim by deposing [the former CEO]." *Id.* at 459

The *Lougee* court denied the deponent and former CEO's motion to quash the deposition.

Florida courts similarly are aware of the apex doctrine but hold that it does not apply in that state and specifically hold that "Florida's discovery rules do not contain a requirement that a party must show that a high level officer has unique or superior knowledge before the officer can

be deposed." *Citigroup, Inc. v. Holtsberg*, 915 So. 2d 1265, 1269; 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 19973. The application of the apex doctrine in Florida is also denied in the more recent case of *General Star Indem. Co. v. Atl. Hospitality of Fla., LLC,* 57 So. 3d 238; 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 3201 (see footnote #3).

Although certain of the examples of the unique and personal knowledge of the CEOs, as contained in the prior section of this Order, are based upon snippets of information gleaned from prior depositions of some of the CEOs, excessive duplication of discovery is not evident in the record being considered. No showing has been made by Purdue that the area of relevant inquiry has been fully developed or appropriately exhausted. Additional deposition testimony of the CEOs is warranted to address the central matters of this administrative proceeding; as noted above, those matters differ from the MDL and other litigation.

Moore's Federal Practice Section 26.60 provides that "[a] court generally will not limit discovery simply because it may be somewhat cumulative and duplicative. Rather, the discovery must be unreasonably so in light of the nature of the inquiry before the court will limit the discovery sought." Among the cases footnoted in the Moore's Federal Practice on the matter of taking depositions is the case of *Travelers Rental Co. v. Ford Motor Co.*, 116 F.R.D. 140, 145 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (while depositions of automobile manufacturer executives were somewhat duplicative and cumulative, the manufacturer was not entitled to have depositions quashed).

III. CEO Landau's sworn declaration provides insufficient justification for a protective order precluding his deposition.

The Presiding Officer has reviewed with care the sworn declaration of the presently sitting CEO, Craig Landau. Most of the statements of the declaration are irrelevant to the issue of taking his deposition.[4]

Paragraph 9 of the declaration provides a clear indication that a deposition is warranted. This paragraph of the declaration states that approximately eight months into his administration as CEO of Purdue his company "ceased deploying sales personnel to promote its opioid medications to prescribers." Presumably, this cessation took place throughout the United States, which includes the State of Utah.

First, this declaration makes clear that for almost eight months he presided over a company that sold opioids aided by a marketing plan directed toward prescribers in Utah. Second, it follows that the cessation of this form of marketing was made eight months into his administration. It is logical to assume that he had knowledge of this dramatic shift in marketing tactics and its cause. Certainly, the Division is entitled to inquire as to his knowledge of such marketing change, whether such change was made at his urging or direction (or someone else's), and whether the terminated marketing plan was experiencing problems that relate to the claims of the Division in its citation.

Only paragraph 12 of the declaration would give the Tribunal any pause in making a determination that protection would be warranted from the taking of the deposition. This Tribunal is sympathetic to the busy work schedule and demands upon the CEO of a significant

[4] The stated facts that CEO Landau is not a resident of Utah, has never had any contacts with Utah, resides and works in Connecticut, from October 1999 to September 2013 had not served in the sales or marketing departments of Purdue, and served for a four year period as CEO of Purdue Pharma of Canada give no support for a protective order. Under each of the facts asserted, he is subject to a Utah subpoena, if the deposition is taken in the state where he resides.

company. However, weighed against the gravity of the claims and alleged consequences in this case, it cannot be said that a deposition of seven hours or less is not warranted. The matter of the burden upon and busy nature of CEO Landau's life is addressed in part in the previous section of this Order. The size and complexity of an entity cannot shield its corporate officers from reasonable inquiry into the scope of their knowledge related to claims involving matters about which they should have known, such as the involvement of key board members and national marketing efforts. Neither can the deponent's own conclusory statements concerning the limits of his knowledge shield him from a deposition.[5]

Returning again to the *Horsewood v. Kids "R" US*, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13108 case discussed above, that court addressed multiple affidavits of the executive officer, Richard Cudrin. Of these affidavits, the Federal Court stated:

> The affidavits of Richard Cudrin present nothing of consequence to warrant a finding of undue burden. Defendant has failed to establish by a particular and specific demonstration of fact that a protective order is warranted. The representation that Cudrin lacks personal knowledge does not suffice to meet its burden of showing good cause for a protective order.

As also noted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in the *Lougee v. Grinnell*, 582 A.2d, 456 case cited above, it "may well be that [the deponent] lacks the information that [plaintiff] desires, but [the plaintiff] need not blindly accept [the deponent's] claimed lack of knowledge as reported by his attorney. [The plaintiff] is entitled to test that claim by deposing [the former CEO]." *Id.* at 459.

---

[5] In fact, the declaration's language in paragraph 11 suggests Mr. Landau's assertion of a lack of knowledge related to the claims may be premised on secondhand information about the citation and the case. The paragraph begins, "I understand that my name is not mentioned...." This statement is followed by statements of belief about what he may have to offer. If Mr. Landau did not even read the citation before preparing his declaration, his demurral is even less persuasive. Even if he is well-acquainted with the citation, it is evident that he likely has information relevant to the matter.

CONCLUSION

The Presiding Officer incorporates by this reference the text of the analysis and authorities of the August 12th Order on CEO Depositions. The apex doctrine, accepted by some federal courts, shifts the burden in discovery matters, applies a different standard for entitlement to depositions, and results in different discovery outcomes than in the many states that have not adopted it. The states of Utah, Connecticut, and Florida, which are the states of most relevance here, have not adopted it. Based upon such analysis and the discussion above in this Order, the Presiding Officer concludes that the depositions of the current CEO and of the three named former CEOs are appropriate.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The John Stewart, Mark Timney, and Michael Friedman depositions may proceed on dates designated in newly issued Subpoenas for dates that are not less than ten calendar days after the date of this Order (or otherwise on dates mutually agreed to by the parties).
2. The Division is directed to comply with the R151-4-513(4) service requirements, unless the Division and the deponents otherwise mutually agree to the subpoenas and notices of depositions being served according to some other procedure.
3. Unless another location is otherwise mutually agreed to by the deponent and each of the parties, the depositions shall take place in the county where the deponent resides.
4. The Division may take the deposition of Dr. Craig Landau.

5. Each individual deposition shall be limited to no more than seven hours of questioning by the Division and each separate deposition shall be taken on only a single day unless the parties agree otherwise.

6. Except for the limitations set forth in the preceding paragraphs, Purdue's motion for a protective order is denied.

DATED September 3, 2019.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Chris Parker, Presiding Officer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 3RD day of September, 2019, I served the foregoing on the parties of record in this proceeding by delivering a copy by electronic means to:

Chris Parker
Acting Director/Presiding Officer
Division of Consumer Protection
chrisparker@utah.gov

Purdue Pharma, L.P.
Purdue Pharma, Inc., and
The Purdue Frederick Company,
(the "Purdue Respondents"),
through counsel
Elisabeth McOmber
Katherine R. Nichols
SNELL & WILMER
emcomber@swlaw.com
knichols@swlaw.com

Purdue Respondents, through counsel
Will Sachse, Sara Roitman, Erik Snapp,
Jared Eisenberg
DECHERT LLP
will.sachse@dechert.com
sara.roitman@dechert.com
erik.snapp@dechert.com
jeisenberg@lynnllp.com

Richard Sackler, and
Kathe Sackler, through counsel
Patrick E. Johnson
Paul T. Moxley
Timothy J. Bywater
COHNE KINGHORN
pjohnson@ck.law
pmoxley@ck.law
tbywater@ck.law

Richard Sackler, through counsel
Douglas J. Pepe, Gregory P. Joseph
Christopher J. Stanley, Mara Leventhal
Roman Asudulayev,
JOSEPH HAGE AARONSON LLC
dpepe@jha.com, gjoseph@jha.com
cstanley@jha.com, mleventhal@jha.com
rasudulayev@jha.com

Kathe Sackler, through counsel
Maura Monaghan, Susan Gittes
Jacob Stahl, Harold Willford
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
mkmonaghan@debevoise.com,
srgittes@debevoise.com, jwstahl@debevoise.com,
hwwillif@debevoise.com

Robert G. Wing, AAG
Kevin McLean, AAG
rwing@agutah.gov
kmclean@agutah.gov
Counsel for the Division

Linda Singer, Elizabeth Smith
Lisa Saltzburg, David Ackerman, Susan Burke
MOTLEY RICE LLC
lsinger@motleyrice.com
esmith@motleyrice.com
lsaltzburg@motleyrice.com
dackerman@motleyrice.com
sburke@motleyrice.com
Counsel for the Division

N. Majed Nachawati, Matthew R. McCarley
Misty Farris, Jonathan Novak, Ann Saucer
FEARS NACHAWATI, PLLC
mn@fnlawfirm.com, mccarley@fnlawfirm.com
mfarris@fnlawfirm.com
jnovak@fnlawfirm.com
asaucer@fnlawfirm.com
Counsel for the Division

Glenn R. Bronson
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON
Glenn-Bronson@rbmn.com
Counsel for the Division

/s/ Nathaniel Gallegos